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  • Implicit Coalitions in a Generalized Prisoners's Dilemma (Classic Reprint)

Implicit Coalitions in a Generalized Prisoners's Dilemma (Classic Reprint)

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Excerpt from Implicit Coalitions in a Generalized Prisoners's Dilemma The presence of a third party can affect attempts by two players to cooperate in a three-player, continuous-alternative, repeated prisoners dilemma-like game. If the third player is uncooperative, two players may find it advantageous to cooperate implicitly, at a level somewhere between full (i e, three-way) cooperation and full defection. We examine this phenomenon of implicit coalitions via two sequential computer tournaments (38 algorithms in tourney 1. 44 algorithms in tourney 2). In both tournaments, each with a different payoff function, the ability to recognize and/or encourage implicit coalitions seems to be a key indicator of success. This result holds up in a test of robustness. We also examine other properties, including those identified earlier by Axelrod (1980a, b) Detailed tournament results are given. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully, any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
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